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Executive Summary 
 
Coal provides 40% of the world’s electricity, with 1,617 GW of global capacity. Of this capacity, 75% is 
subcritical, 22% supercritical, and 3% ultra-supercritical. Subcritical is the least efficient and most 
polluting form of coal-fired generation - it requires more fuel and water to generate the same amount 
of power, and creates more pollution as a result. The average subcritical coal-fired power station 
(SCPS) emits 75% more carbon pollution than an average advanced ultra-supercritical - the most up-
to-date form of coal-fired power station - and uses 67% more water.  
 
To limit global emissions to a level consistent with a 2°C future, the IEA estimates that it will be 
necessary to close a quarter (290 GW) of subcritical generation worldwide by 2020. Subcritical coal 
accounted for 8.6 GtCO2 of emissions globally in 2009. For context, in 2010 annual gross greenhouse 
gas emissions globally totalled ~50 GtCO2-equivalent.  
 
Since SCPSs are the least efficient and most greenhouse gas (GHG) intensive centralised generation 
technology, they are both vulnerable to regulation and a logical first step in any climate mitigation 
strategy. Moreover, due to their greater average fuel-burn, SCPSs are also more vulnerable to non-
GHG policies, such as policies regulating the emission of PM, NOx, SOx, and mercury. SCPSs are also 
highly vulnerable to water policies. Given these potential drivers of asset stranding - carbon intensity, 
air pollution, and water stress - this working paper examines the exposure to these risks of Australia’s 
22 SCPSs and the 19 companies that own them. As part of this process we have ranked company 
exposure to SCPSs affected by these three different environment-related risk factors. The full rankings 
of company exposure can be found in Section 3. We also examine how risks facing subcritical coal 
assets might develop in the future.  
 
Additionally, as policymakers may be interested in inducing early closure of SCPS assets due to 
concerns over climate change and localised environmental impacts, our research conservatively 
estimates the maximum cost required to compensate the owners of Australian subcritical assets for 
premature retirement. We examine why this could be desirable and also say something about how 
this could be done in the most cost-effective way possible.  
 
This working paper is potentially useful for two groups. It could help investors to identify and screen 
specific companies with exposure to SCPS assets in Australia at particular risk from climate policy, air 
pollution, and water stress. It will also help Australian policymakers interested in understanding the 
costs, benefits, and mechanisms for prematurely closing SCPSs. The paper is an interim output from a 
global project on subcritical coal from investment risk and public policy perspectives. The first phase 
report on investment risk globally was published on the 13th March 2015 and can be downloaded 
here. The second phase report, on public policy implications will be published in Summer 2015. This 
paper brings together research from these two phases as they relate to Australia.   
 
Determining carbon, air pollution, and water stress exposure  
 
Following the IEA, this report defines SCPSs as power plants with carbon-intensity of ≥880kg 
CO2/MWh, with cutoffs of 880-1,120kg CO2/MWh defined for ‘new subcritical’, 1,120-1,340kg 
CO2/MWh for ‘old efficient subcritical’, and >1,340kg CO2/MWh for ‘old inefficient subcritical’. To 
complete our analysis we have effectively defined the locations of all of Australia’s SCPSs, the 
ownership of these plants, the annual megawatt hours of electricity produced at each plant, and the 
carbon intensity of each plant’s electricity production.  
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To determine the potential vulnerability of SCPSs to air quality-related regulations, we took the 
100km radius around each SCPS in the world and calculated the average satellite-based PM 2.5 
observations within that area. Although we cannot directly attribute PM 2.5 levels measured to the 
corresponding SCPS, there is almost certainly a significant degree of causality, which may place 
plants in high PM 2.5 areas under greater risk from regulatory responses to air quality concerns.  
 
Similarly, to determine the potential vulnerability of SCPSs to water-related regulations, we looked at 
the Baseline Water Stress (BWS) that SCPSs faced in their water catchment areas. SCPSs in extremely 
high water stress catchments, defined as watersheds with >80% withdrawal to available flow ratios, 
may be at more risk from water-related regulations or a shortage of water availability, than plants in 
areas with more water availability.  
 
Subcritical coal in Australia 
 
Coal is used to generate 56% of Australia’s electricity and 89% of this comes from SCPSs. Power 
generation accounts for almost 30% of Australia’s total CO2 emissions, and 80% of this (24% of 
Australia’s total CO2 emissions) comes from SCPSs. In Australia there is a total of 29,467MW of 
subcritical and supercritical capacity, of which 26,088MW, is subcritical. Australia has no coal-fired 
power stations that use the most efficient ultra-supercritical technology. 
 
Australia’s Coal-fired Fleet 
Total Coal-fired 
Capacity (MW) 
Average Age of 
All Coal-fired 
Boilers  
Subcritical 
Coal-fired 
Capacity (MW) 
Average Age 
of Subcritical 
Capacity 
Supercritical 
Coal-fired 
Capacity (MW) 
Average Age of 
Supercritical 
Capacity  
29,467 28 26,088 31 3,379 11 
Average age is weighted by boiler capacity, and if a boiler has been refurbished then its age is reset to the date of the most 
recent refurbishment. 
 
Of this 26,088MW of subcritical capacity, 24,608MW is currently operational and 1,480MW is 
currently mothballed and awaiting more favourable economic conditions. The 22 SCPSs in Australia 
are owned by 19 companies with three power stations owned jointly (see Section 3). Nine out of the 
top 10 highest carbon emitters in Australia are owners of subcritical assets. Four companies 
comprising 11 power stations (AGL Energy, Origin Energy, Stanwell Corporation, and Delta 
Electricity) are responsible for more than half of Australia’s total SCPS capacity.  
 
Operational and Mothballed Subcritical Capacity 
Operational Subcritical 
Capacity (MW) 
Average Age of Operational 
Subcritical Capacity 
Mothballed Subcritical 
Capacity (MW) 
Average Age of Mothballed 
Subcritical Capacity 
24,608 30 1,480 34 
Average age is weighted by boiler capacity, and if a boiler has been refurbished then its age is reset to the date of the most 
recent refurbishment. 
 
Although Australia is only responsible for 2.2% of the world’s SCPS generation, it has the highest 
average carbon intensity of any major SCPS emitting country. There is a significant portion of 
Australian SCPSs that are either past or approaching the end of their technical life (approximately 40 
years). Given that 46% of Australian subcritical boilers 35 years and older are currently mothballed, 
the vulnerability of these assets is high. With the current situation of falling energy demand in 
Australia, any new regulation that would require capital expenditure for regulatory compliance could 
force the decommissioning and permanent closure of these assets.   
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National SCPS Fleet Generation and Carbon Intensity 
  Number of 
SCPSs 
Total SCPS 
TWh 
Percentage of world SCPS 
TWh 
Mean SCPS carbon intensity (kg 
CO2/MWh)† 
World 7,446 7,349 100.00% 1,042 
China 930 2,718 36.98% 1,048 
US 665 1,539 20.94% 1,040 
EU 1,280‡ 729 9.92% 1,051 
India 608 783 10.65% 1,058 
Australia 22 162 2.20% 1,132 
South Africa 25 194 2.64% 1,034 
Indonesia 337 87 1.18% 1,058 
†SCPS mean carbon intensity is weighted by MWh of generation. The unweighted global SCPS mean carbon intensity is not 
materially different at 1,047 kg CO2/MWh.  
‡The EU has a particularly large number of micro power plants with poor carbon efficiency. 
 
Although the carbon tax was repealed in 2014, many Australian subcritical generators are now 
mothballed due to lower-than-expected energy demand and competition from renewables. While 
these mothballed plants may represent option value to generating companies, they are particularly 
vulnerable to new non-GHG and water regulations that would require capital-intensive retrofits. 
Additionally, if policymakers wished to operate a voluntary compensation scheme, such as the 
operation of reverse auctions to permanently close subcritical boilers, it is likely that generating 
companies would be willing to accept lower than business-as-usual (BAU) compensation for 
mothballed plants. This would particularly be the case if the auctions were operated in tandem with 
the introduction of new emission regulations.  
 
Costs of closure  
 
We have created illustrative scenarios in which all SCPSs in Australia are closed within 5, 10, or 15-
year time horizons. As part of this, we calculated the maximum conceivable compensation that could 
be paid to owners of SCPSs to induce premature retirement of their assets over these time periods.
  
 
Subcritical Closure Scenarios 
 
Future profits are modelled using a revenues-minus-costs approach. Calculations are made 
individually for each generating unit until the end of their technical lives. We assume that mothballed 
units are operational from 2016 onwards. All calculations are made using highly conservative BAU 
assumptions (see the appendix for a list of all assumptions).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scenario Years of Plant 
Closures 
% Generators 
Closed Annually 
Order of Closure Policy Assumptions 
S5 2016-2020 20%  
 
Oldest to Newest 
Direct regulation used for 
closure, no new subcritical 
capacity added, 
mothballed generators 
receive compensation as if 
they were operational  
S10 2016-2025 10% 
S15 2016-2030 6.7% 
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Maximum Conceivable Compensation (2015 AU$) 
 
 
 
For Australian SCPSs, the maximum conceivable compensation in 2015 prices would be AU$18.3bn 
(or AU$3.66bn per year) in scenario S5, AU$13.7bn (or AU$1.37bn per year) in scenario S10, and 
AU$8.4bn (or AU$560 million per year) in scenario S15. Total compensation decreases with scenario 
length because more generators reach the end of their technical lifespan before they are eligible for 
compensation.  
 
In the Australian case owners should only expect to receive partial compensation that is significantly 
less than the figures indicated above. This is due to the following reasons. First, Australia’s takings 
jurisprudence gives no indication that government should compensate firms for impairment of 
profits. Second, we identify no implicit or explicit contractual bases for compensation of firms by 
government. This is particularly the case given that the competitive National Electricity Market has 
operated for over 15 years. Third, there is very little precedent supporting the compensated closure of 
assets in Australia. The CFC programme provides some precedent, though it did not close a single 
asset. Australia’s carbon tax also provides precedent; however, we argue that this is more of a case of 
buyout of industry to allow policymaking than evidence of the necessity of compensation for the 
closure of assets. Fourth, as is recognized throughout this report, coal plays a significant factor in 
Australian politics. Because of this, we do not rule out investor compensation altogether. The 
evidence that this report cites for this conclusion is as follows. Australia’s most carbon-intensive 
generators were compensated for the effects of the now-repealed carbon tax on their profits. 
However, the comparison of our valuation of Hazelwood Power Station and their 2011 plant self-
valuation for the CFC programme suggests that the dirtiest power stations were not in danger of 
imminent collapse, as was claimed. 
 
The compensation modelling has assumed that all subcritical power stations would be part of the 
closure programme. A potentially significant way to further reduce the total cost of compensation, as 
well as the costs of decommissioning and replacement capacity, is for the closure programme to 
target a subset of SCPSs. 
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Reverse auctions  
 
Reverse auctions could be a policy mechanism for cost-effectively retiring SCPSs. Owners of SCPS 
assets would bid to receive a fixed price for each unit of generation capacity retired. The lowest bids 
would win the auction. While similar to the Contract for Closure and the Australian Emissions 
Reduction Fund, key design differences could lead to drastically different policy outcomes. For 
example: 
 
• Reverse auctions should be operated in tandem with the introduction of new emission 
regulations. 
 
• There should be a timeline for the retirement of subcritical generators, which could be based 
on the ratcheting up of an appropriately strict Emission Performance Standard (EPS). 
 
• A Coal Closure Fund (CCF) could be established - this would be a ring-fenced fund used to 
pay for reverse auctions.  
 
• Auctions could be operated annually or semi-annually until the year of mandatory closure or 
retrofit. The amount of compensation available could decrease with each auction in a 
“degression” model to further incentivise earlier retirement.  
 
Reverse auctions eliminate the problem of information asymmetry between government and the 
owners of SCPS assets. As some owners will have sunk costs (i.e. maintenance and retrofits), this lets 
owners reach an equitable outcome amongst themselves.  
 
This approach also establishes a robust framework for how owners can participate in negotiations. 
Political contestation around the closure of subcritical assets with reverse auctions is inevitable and 
should be expected; however, by creating a robust framework the potential for escalating 
compensation demands can be contained.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The international community needs options for addressing the most significant contributors to 
anthropogenic climate change. One option, presented publicly by Christiana Figueres, executive 
secretary of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), is the closure 
of subcritical coal-fired power stations (SCPSs).1 To limit global emissions to a level consistent with a 
2°C future, it is necessary to close a quarter, or 290 gigawatts (GW), of subcritical generation 
worldwide by 2020.2 
 
Since SCPSs are the least efficient and most greenhouse gas (GHG) intensive centralised generation 
technology, they are both vulnerable to regulation and a logical first step in any climate mitigation 
strategy. In Australia, coal is used to generate 56% of total electricity demand and 89% of this comes 
from SCPSs3. Power generation accounts for almost 30% of Australia’s total CO2 emissions4, and 80% 
of this (24% of Australia’s total CO2 emissions) comes from SCPSs.  
 
Moreover, due to their greater average fuel-burn, SCPSs are also more vulnerable to non-GHG 
policies, such as policies regulating the emission of PM, NOx, SOx, and mercury. SCPSs are also 
highly vulnerable to water policies. Given these potential drivers of asset stranding - carbon intensity, 
air pollution, and water stress - this working paper examines the exposure to these risks of Australia’s 
22 SCPSs and the 19 companies that own them. We also examine how risks facing subcritical coal 
assets might develop in the future.  
 
Additionally, as policymakers may be interested in inducing early closure of SCPS assets due to 
concerns over climate change and localised environmental impacts, our research conservatively 
estimates how much it would cost to compensate the owners of Australian subcritical assets to 
prematurely retire them. We examine why this could be desirable and also say something about how 
this could be done in the most cost-effective way possible.  
 
This working paper is therefore potentially useful for two groups. It could help investors to identify 
and screen specific companies with exposure to SCPS assets in Australia at particular risk from 
climate policy, air pollution, and water stress. It will also help Australian policymakers interested in 
understanding the costs, benefits, and mechanisms for prematurely closing SCPSs. The paper is an 
interim output from a global project on subcritical coal from investment risk and public policy 
perspectives. The first phase report on investment risk globally was published on the 13th March 2015 
and can be downloaded here. The second phase report, on public policy implications will be 
published in Summer 2015. This paper brings together research from these two phases as they relate 
to Australia.  
 
                                                            
1 HSBC (17 January 2014). "Coal and carbon revisited." 
2 IEA (2013). Redrawing the Energy Climate Map. Paris, France, OECD/IEA.  
3 Simshauser, P. and T. Nelson (2012). "The second-round effects of carbon taxes on power project finance." Journal of Financial 
Economic Policy 4(2): 104-127. 
4 Hannam, P. and L. Cox (18 March, 2015). AGL tops list of big carbon emitters after merger, ACF report finds. Sydney 
Morning Herald. 
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2. Subcritical Coal and Australia 
 
Subcritical power stations use subcritical boilers. These boilers operate at relatively lower pressures 
and temperatures, which leads to an inefficient steam cycle in generation because water is present 
both as liquid and gas.5 Because coal-fired power production is by far the most emissions-intensive 
form of power generation,6 and subcritical the least efficient subset, subcritical coal-fired power 
stations are the most carbon-intensive technology used for centralised electricity generation. 
Although the efficiency of these power stations has improved over time, even the newest and most 
efficient subcritical generators are significantly more carbon-intensive than existing supercritical and 
ultra-supercritical technologies, as well as forthcoming advanced ultra-supercritical technology. 
Following the IEA, this report defines SCPSs as power stations with carbon-intensities of ≥880kg 
CO2/MWh. 
 
Figure 1: Average CO2 Intensity and Efficiency by Coal-fired Generation Boiler Type 
 
 
Source: IEA (2013). Redrawing the Energy Climate Map. Paris, France, OECD/IEA 
 
In addition to efficiency, the age of generators also plays a role in their regulatory vulnerability. 
Because of the age of subcritical boiler technology, SCPSs generally represent the oldest part of 
national generation fleets. This is significant because it is financially (and potentially politically) 
                                                            
5 Susta, M. and K. B. Seong (2004). Supercritical and Ultra-Supercritical Power Plants - SEA's Vision or Reality?, PowerGen 
Asia. 
6 Roughly a factor of two, Moomaw, W., G. Burgherr, M. Heath, M. Lenzen, J. Nyboer and A. Verbruggen (2011). 2011: Annex 
II: Methodology. In IPCC Special Report on Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change Mitigation. O. Edenhofer, R. 
Pichs-Madruga, Y. Sokona et al. Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York USA, Cambridge University Press. 
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simpler to regulate the closure of older power stations. This is due to the fact that capital costs have 
typically been recovered after 35 years of operation7; and when generators are near or past their 
technical lives, the financial need to compensate is greatly reduced or eliminated.8  
 
This is particularly relevant in Australia. As seen in Figure 2, while SCPSs represent the bulk of 
Australian coal-fired capacity, a significant portion is either past or approaching the end of its 
technical life. Given that 46% of Australian subcritical boilers 35 years9 and older are currently 
mothballed, the vulnerability of these assets is high. With the current situation of falling energy 
demand in Australia, any new regulation that would require capital expenditure for regulatory 
compliance could force the decommissioning and permanent closure of these assets.   
 
Figure 2: Australia Coal-Fired Generation by Age and Boiler Technology 
 
Source: IEA (2012) 
 
Policy Vulnerability 
 
The limited work on subcritical coal-fired power generation has thus far focused on the role of SCPS 
closures in climate change mitigation scenarios.10 Because they are the most inefficient power stations, 
in these scenarios SCPS are closed quickly and at large scales. For instance, IEA modelling of a power 
sector transition compatible with 2°C global warming suggests that it would rely on the closure of a 
quarter of global SCPS capacity (290GW) by 2020.11 Subcritical power stations are also highly 
vulnerable to non-GHG and water abstraction policies because of their emission-intensiveness and 
high water use.12 
 
                                                            
7 IEA (2014). Energy, Climate Change and Environment. Paris, France, OECD/IEA.  
8 This assertion is supported by the three case studies explored later in this report. In each, compensation amount was a 
function of expected future profits. 
9 Age is defined by the date of construction or most recent boiler replacement. 
10 IEA (2014). Energy, Climate Change and Environment. Paris, France, OECD/IEA. 
11 IEA (2013). Redrawing the Energy Climate Map. Paris, France, OECD/IEA. 
12 For full discussion of the vulnerability of subcritical power stations, see Caldecott, B. and J. Mitchell (Forthcoming 2015). 
"Generating Implications for Climate Policy: The Premature Retirement of Subcritical Coal-Fired Generation and the Potential 
Role of Compensation." Stranded Assets Programme, Smith School for Enterprise and Environment, University of Oxford. 
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Table 1: Coal-fired Environmental Effects by Generation Efficiency, Base-level = 100 
 
Generation Efficiency Carbon Intensity Air Pollution Water Stress 
Old Inefficient Subcritical 100 100 100 
Old Efficient Subcritical  84 84 85 
New Subcritical 68 68 70 
Supercritical 57 57 60 
Ultra-Supercritical 52 52 55 
Advanced Ultra-Supercritical 48 48 51 
Note: Indicated levels of environmental effects based off of ceteris paribus generating conditions for a closed-cycle wet-cooled 
plant. Water stress levels based off of EPRI (2008).13 
 
SCPSs in Australia 
 
Australia’s Contract for Closure (CFC) programme provides useful context for understanding the 
highly political role of SCPSs in Australia as well as potential future risks. The CFC programme was 
planned for implementation under Australia’s 2011 Clean Energy Future package, which was meant 
to provide AU$5.5bn in transitional assistance to emissions-intensive generators and an undisclosed, 
capped amount via the CFC programme to “negotiate the closure of around 2,000 MW of highly 
emissions-intensive coal-fired electricity generation capacity by 2020.”14  
 
The programme was announced in June 2011. After the selection of five SCPSs for CFC in late 2011, 
negotiations for compensation payments began. However, no agreements were reached by June 2012 
and negotiations were cancelled in September 2012. 15 Cancellation was due to fundamental 
disagreements and large disparities between government and firm valuation of assets.  
 
This raises two important issues for any future closure of SCPSs in Australia. They are inherently 
intertwined but are presented separately for clarity. The first is the issue of compensation. The offer of 
compensation for the impairment of SCPSs’ profits was extraordinary. Previous to the compensation 
paid to carbon-intensive generators for Australia’s now-repealed carbon tax, there was no precedent 
to suggest “that owners of capital assets should be compensated for changes in government policy 
that reduce the expected flow of income from those assets.”16 Additionally, an analysis of explicit and 
implicit contracts, as well as Australian takings jurisprudence suggests that there were no legal or 
theoretical rationales for the offer of compensation through CFC.17 This raises questions about the 
purpose of compensation. Menezes (2009) suggests that the purpose of compensation is actually to 
reduce the incentive to lobby against legislation that would reduce profits from capital assets.18  
 
The second issue is the inevitable political role of coal in Australian politics, as suggested by Menezes 
(2009). Interviews with a government insider reveal another possible rationale for the CFC program. 
                                                            
13 R. Goldstein, Water Use for Electric Power Generation, vol. 3 (Palo Alto, CA, 2008), EPRI. 
14 Department of Resources Energy and Tourism, Contract for Closure Programme Administrative Guidelines (Australia: 2011), 
1-2. 
15 Tom Arup, “Latrobe Valley Generators Embrace ALP Carbon Plan,” The Age, October 22, 2011. 
16 Flavio Menezes, John Quiggin, and Liam Wagner, “Grandfathering and Greenhouse: The Role of Compensation and 
Adjustment Assistance in the Introduction of a Carbon Emissions Trading Scheme for Australia,” Economic Papers: A journal of 
applied economics and policy 28, no. 2 (June 2009): 86. 
17 Caldecott, B. and J. Mitchell (Forthcoming 2015). “Generating Implications for Climate Policy: The Premature Retirement of 
Subcritical Coal-Fired Generation and the Potential Role of Compensation.” Stranded Assets Programme, Smith School for 
Enterprise and Environment, University of Oxford. 
18 Flavio Menezes, John Quiggin, and Liam Wagner, “Grandfathering and Greenhouse: The Role of Compensation and 
Adjustment Assistance in the Introduction of a Carbon Emissions Trading Scheme for Australia,” Economic Papers: A journal of 
applied economics and policy 28, no. 2 (June 2009): 82–92. 
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According to this source, the full purpose of the program was not to just close generators. Rather, it 
also had the goal of forcing generating companies to publicly value themselves, and thereby reveal 
whether they had in fact been bluffing when they had initially stated that Australia’s Carbon Tax 
would cause the unanticipated closure of power plants.19 Although this assertion could not be 
corroborated, in retrospect, claims of sudden closure forced by the carbon tax seem unfounded. This 
is supported by the similarities between our valuation and firm valuations of Hazelwood SCPS: 
previously regarded as the most carbon intensive power station in the OECD.20 The firm’s self-
valuation of the plant was purportedly AU$3bn.21 Our conservative BAU valuation produced very 
similar results22. This suggests that Australia’s carbon tax was not impacting the profits of generators 
so heavily that they would have been on the brink of closure. 
 
There are lessons here for investors and policymakers. As a recent analysis of the impacts of the 
European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) showed, it is incredibly difficult to close aging 
generators with carbon taxation or emission trading systems alone. For example, in Germany, an EU 
ETS carbon price of US$110 would be necessary to dispatch a new gas plant ahead of an older coal-
fired plant.23 This is the case for two reasons. First, incredibly high carbon prices are necessary to shut 
down coal-fired generators that have recovered most or all of their capital costs. 24  Second, 
compensation in the form of free emission credits (as in the EU) or cash handouts (as in Australia) 
exacerbates this problem by artificially increasing the profitability of operation. 
 
In 2015 the Australian context has changed. Although the carbon tax was repealed in 2014, many 
Australian subcritical generators are now mothballed due to lower-than-expected energy demand 
and competition from renewables.25 While these mothballed plants may represent option value to 
generating companies, they are particularly vulnerable to new non-GHG and water regulations that 
would require capital-intensive retrofits. Additionally, if policymakers wished to operate a voluntary 
compensation scheme, such as the operation of reverse auctions to permanently close subcritical 
boilers, 26  it is likely that generating companies would be willing to accept lower than BAU 
compensation for mothballed plants. This would particularly be the case if the auctions were 
operated in tandem with the introduction of new emission regulations.  
                                                            
19 Weller, S. (2015). Direct Action is No Action? Australia's 'Contract for Closure' of Coal-Fired Power Stations. Fouth Annual 
Conference on Economic Geography. University of Oxford. 
20 WWF (12 July, 2005). "Hazelwood tops international list of dirty power stations." 
21 Tom Arup, “Latrobe Valley Generators Embrace ALP Carbon Plan,” The Age, October 22, 2011. 
22 We estimated required compensation of AU$2.6bn, 2.3bn, and 1.9bn to close Hazelwood power station in 5, 10, and 15 years, 
respectively. Note that, by contrast, the AU$3bn figure implies immediate closure. Weller (2015) shows that it is likely that this 
figure also incorporates the costs of closure and decommissioning, which was not included in our analyses. 
23 IEA (2014). Energy, Climate Change and Environment. Paris, France, OECD/IEA. Paris, France, OECD/IEA. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Nelson, Reid, and McNeil (2014), “Energy-only markets and renewable energy targets: complementary policy or policy 
collision?” AGL Applied Economic and Policy Research Working Paper No.43 
26 Caldecott and Mitchell (Forthcoming 2015). “Premature Retirement of Sub-critical Coal Assets: The Potential Role of 
Compensation and the Implications for International Climate Policy,” Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International relations 
Spring/Summer 2015.
  
 
Subcritical Coal in Australia - Working Paper - March 2015  15 
 
3. Australian SCPS Portfolios 
 
Analysing Australia’s coal-fired generation, we find that there is a total of 29,467MW of subcritical 
and supercritical capacity, of which 26,088MW, or 89%, is subcritical. Australia has no coal-fired 
power stations that use the most efficient ultra-supercritical technology. 
 
Table 2: Australia’s Coal-fired Fleet 
Total Coal-fired 
Capacity (MW) 
Average Age of 
All Coal-fired 
Boilers  
Subcritical 
Coal-fired 
Capacity 
(MW) 
Average Age of 
Subcritical 
Capacity 
Supercritical 
Coal-fired 
Capacity (MW) 
Average Age of 
Supercritical 
Capacity  
29,467 28 26,088 31 3,379 11 
Average age is weighted by boiler capacity, and if a boiler has been refurbished then its age is reset to the date of the most 
recent refurbishment. 
 
Of this 26,088MW of subcritical capacity, 24,608MW is currently operational and 1,480MW is 
currently mothballed and awaiting more favourable economic conditions. 
 
Table 3: Operational and Mothballed Subcritical Capacity 
Operational Subcritical 
Capacity (MW) 
Average Age of Operational 
Subcritical Capacity 
Mothballed Subcritical 
Capacity (MW) 
Average Age of Mothballed 
Subcritical Capacity 
24,608 30 1,480 34 
Average age is weighted by boiler capacity, and if a boiler has been refurbished then its age is reset to the date of the most 
recent refurbishment. 
 
Although Australia is only responsible for 2.2% of the world’s SCPS generation, it has the highest 
average carbon intensity of any major SCPS emitting country.  
 
Table 4: National SCPS Fleet Generation and Carbon Intensity 
  Number of 
SCPSs 
Total SCPS 
TWh 
Percentage of world SCPS 
TWh 
Mean SCPS carbon intensity (kg 
CO2/MWh)† 
World 7,446 7,349 100.00% 1,042 
China 930 2,718 36.98% 1,048 
US 665 1,539 20.94% 1,040 
EU 1,280‡ 729 9.92% 1,051 
India 608 783 10.65% 1,058 
Australia 22 162 2.20% 1,132 
South Africa 25 194 2.64% 1,034 
Indonesia 337 87 1.18% 1,058 
†SCPS mean carbon intensity is weighted by MWh of generation. The unweighted global SCPS mean carbon intensity is not 
materially different at 1,047 kg CO2/MWh.  
‡The EU has a particularly large number of micro power plants with poor carbon efficiency. 
 
The following table discloses relevant characteristics of each of the 22 operational and mothballed 
subcritical generators in Australia by order of generating capacity. This information was derived from 
the most recent version (v3) of Carbon Monitoring for Action (CARMA) and Enipedia, and verified 
with internet research27.  
                                                            
27 See the Appendix for greater detail on the data methodology. 
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Table 5: All Australian SCPSs by Capacity 
 
Name State Owner(s) Boiler(s) 
(MW) 
Total 
Capacity 
(MW) 
Fuel Boiler(s) 
Opened 
Refurbished Boiler 
Age(s) 
Status 
Eraring Power 
Station 
New South 
Wales 
Origin Energy 4x720 2,880 Bituminous Coal 1982-1984  31-33 Operational 
Bayswater Power 
Station 
New South 
Wales 
AGL Energy 4x660 2,640 Coal 1985-1986  29-30 Operational 
Loy Yang A Power 
Station 
Victoria AGL Energy 4x525 2,200 Brown Coal 1985  30 Operational 
Liddell Power Station New South 
Wales 
AGL Energy 
 
4x500 
 
2,000 
 
Coal 
 
1971 
 
 44 
 
Operational 
 
Gladstone Power 
Station 
Queensland 
 
 
Rio Tinto (42.125%) 
NRG Energy (37.5%) 
SLMA GPS (8.5%) 
Ryowa II GPS (7.125%) 
YKK GPS (4.75%) 
6x280 1,680 Bituminous Coal 1976  39 Operational 
Hazelwood Power 
Station 
Victoria GDF Suez Australian Energy (72%) 
Mitsui & Co (28%) 
8x200 1,600 
 
Brown Coal 
 
1971 
 
1996 
 
19 
 
Operational 
 
Yallourn W Power 
Station 
Victoria CLP 2x350, 
2x375 
1,450 Coal 1982  33 Operational 
Mount Piper Power 
Station 
New South 
Wales 
EnergyAustralia 
 
2x700 
 
1,400 
 
Coal 
 
1992-1993 
 
 22-23 
 
Operational 
 
Stanwell Power 
Station 
Queensland Stanwell Corporation 4x350 1,400 Coal 1996  19 Operational 
Tarong Power 
Station 
Queensland Stanwell Corporation 4x350 1,400 Bituminous Coal 1984-1986  29-31 Operational 
Vales Point Power 
Station 
New South 
Wales 
Delta Electricity 2x660 
 
1,320 
 
Coal 
 
1978 
 
 37 
 
Operational 
 
Loy Yang B Power 
Station 
Victoria 
 
GDF Suez Australian Energy (70%) 
Mitsui & Co (30%) 
2x525 
 
1,050 
 
Brown Coal 
 
1985 
 
 30 
 
Operational 
 
Wallerawang Power 
Station 
New South 
Wales 
Delta Electricity 2x500 
 
1,000 
 
Bituminous 
 
1976-1980 
 
 35-39 
 
Mothballed 
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Muja Power Station‡ Western 
Australia 
Synergy 2x200, 
2x227 
854 
 
Coal 
 
1980-1985 
 
 30-35 
 
Operational 
 
Callide Power Station Queensland 
 
CS Energy 
 
2x350, 
4x30 
820 
 
Coal 
 
1965-1988 
 
partly 1998 
 
17-27 
 
Operational 
 
Kwinana Power 
Station 
Western 
Australia 
Synergy 2x120, 
2x200 
640 
 
Coal† 
 
1976-1978 
 
 37-39 
 
Operational 
 
Northern Power 
Station 
South 
Australia 
Alinta Energy 
 
2x260 
 
520 
 
Subbituminous 
Coal 
1985 
 
 30 
 
Operational 
 
Collie Power Station Western 
Australia 
Synergy 
 
1x300 
 
300 
 
Coal 
 
1999 
 
 16 
 
Operational 
 
Muja Power Station‡ 
 
Western 
Australia 
Synergy 
 
4x60 
 
240 
 
Coal 
 
1965-1969 
 
 46-50 
 
Mothballed 
 
Playford B Power 
Station 
South 
Australia 
Alinta Energy 
 
4x60 
 
240 
 
Subbituminous 
Coal 
1963 
 
2005 
 
10 
 
Mothballed 
 
Collinsville Power 
Station 
Queensland Ratch Corporation 4x31, 
1x66 
190 Coal 1968-1976 1999 16 Operational 
Anglesea Power 
Station 
Victoria Alcoa 1x150 150 Coal 1969  46 Operational 
Worsley Alumina Western 
Australia 
GE 
 
2x57 
 
114 
 
Bituminous 
 
2012 
 
 3 
 
Operational 
 
†Kwinana Power Station has the ability to burn coal, gas, and oil fuels. This power station is scheduled to close in 2015. 
‡Muja power station is listed twice to account separately for the 4 boilers that are operational and the 4 that are mothballed. 
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The primary environmental and policy risks that SCPSs face are related to carbon intensity, air 
quality, and water stress. The following section delineates these risks with respect to each of 
Australia’s existing SCPSs.  
 
The carbon intensity data by power plant again comes from CARMA v3 estimates. According to this 
source, some power plants that are typically classified as ‘subcritical’, such as Western Australia’s 
Bluewaters power plant at 825kg CO2/MWh, fall into the supercritical category and are therefore not 
examined here.  
 
To determine the potential vulnerability of SCPSs to air quality-related regulations, we took the 
100km radius around each SCPS in the world and calculated the average of the PM 2.5 observations 
from Boys, Martin et al. (2014) measured within that radius28. Although we cannot directly attribute 
PM 2.5 levels measured within each 100km radius to emissions from the corresponding SCPS, there 
would almost certainly be a significant degree of causality relevant for policy. Australia’s national PM 
2.5 limit is among the world’s strictest at only 8 µg/m3. The World Health Organisation’s maximum 
limit is 20 µg/m3. 
 
The measure for water stress used in this report is Baseline Water Stress (BWS) from Aqueduct 
created by the World Resources Institute (WRI). BWS is defined as total annual water withdrawals 
(municipal, industrial, and agricultural) expressed as a percent of the total annual available flow 
within the given catchment area. Higher values indicate greater competition for water among users. 
Extremely high water stress areas are defined by WRI as watersheds with >80% withdrawal to 
available flow ratios, 80-40% as high water stress, 40-20% as high to medium, 20-10% as medium to 
low, and <10% as low. The water stress level for a given SCPS is the level corresponding to that of the 
catchment where the station is located. 
 
Table 6: Australian SCPS Carbon Intensity, 100km Radius PM 2.5 Air Quality, and 
Baseline Water Stress by Generation Capacity 
 
Name 
 
Capacity 
(MW)  
Carbon Intensity kg 
CO2/MWh 
100km Radius Average 
PM 2.5 µg/m3 
Baseline Water 
Stress 
Eraring Power Station 2,880 1,130 2 100.00% 
Bayswater Power Station 2,640 1,130 2 53.77% 
Loy Yang A Power Station 2,200 1,150 3 57.59% 
Liddell Power Station 2,000 1,090 2 53.77% 
Gladstone Power Station 1,680 1,100 2 100.00% 
Hazelwood Power Station 1,600 1,550 3 57.59% 
Yallourn W Power Station 1,450 1,190 3 57.59% 
Mount Piper Power Station 1,400 978 2 30.97% 
Stanwell Power Station 1,400 1,070 2 1.40% 
Tarong Power Station 1,400 1,100 2 75.03% 
Vales Point Power Station 1,320 1,030 2 100.00% 
Loy Yang B Power Station 1,050 1,110 3 57.59% 
Wallerawang Power Station 1,000 1,020 2 30.97% 
Muja Power Station 854 1,140 2 2.73% 
Callide Power Station 820 1,000 2 23.26% 
Kwinana Power Station 640 1,060 2 0.00% 
                                                            
28On average there were 270 PM 2.5 observations within each 100km radius. See appendix for PM 2.5 air pollution data sources 
and methods. 
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Northern Power Station 520 1,110 2 21.97% 
Collie Power Station 300 1,130 2 2.73% 
Muja Power Station 240 1,140 2 2.73% 
Playford B Power Station 240 1,100 2 21.97% 
Collinsville Power Station 190 1,310 2 4.37% 
Anglesea Power Station 150 1,450 3 18.73% 
Worsley Alumina 114 1,310 2 23.06% 
Portfolio Risk  
 
The 22 SCPSs in Australia are owned by a total of 19 companies, with three power stations owned 
jointly. Nine out of the top 10 highest carbon emitters in Australia are owners of subcritical assets29. In 
order to assess the risks borne by the owners of these assets, we also calculate the total subcritical 
capacity owned by each corporation, the capacity weighted average, plant age, carbon intensity, PM 
2.5 air pollution, and baseline water stress. We see from Table 7 below that just four companies 
comprising 11 power stations (AGL Energy, Origin Energy, Stanwell Corporation, and Delta 
Electricity) are responsible for more than half of Australia’s total SCPS capacity.  
 
In term of age, 64% of Australia’s SCPS capacity is 30 years old or greater. And only GE and Ratch 
Corporation have average boiler ages under 20 years, with the oldest average ages held by Alcoa (46 
years) and Rio Tinto/NRG Energy/SLMA GPS/Ryowa II GPS/YKK GPS (39 years). 
                                                            
29 The top 10 list comes from Australian Conservation Foundation (2015). "Australia's top 10 climate polluters." Macquarie 
Generation is now a subsidiary of AGL Energy, and the missing 10th largest polluter is Woodside Petroleum. 
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Table 7: Australian Portfolios by Total Generation Capacity  
 
Owner Total 
Capacity 
(MW) 
Number 
of SCPSs 
Number 
of Boilers 
Average 
Boiler Age 
Carbon 
Intensity kg 
CO2/MWh 
Average 
PM 2.5 
µg/m3 
Average 
Baseline Water 
Stress 
AGL Energy 6,840 3 12 34 1,125 2 55.00% 
Origin Energy 2,880 1 4 32 1,130 2 100.00% 
Stanwell Corporation 2,800 2 8 25 1,085 2 38.22% 
Delta Electricity 2,320 2 4 37 1,026 2 70.25% 
Synergy 2,034 3 13 34 1,113 2 1.87% 
GDF Suez Australian 
Energy* 
1,855 2 10 38 1,376 3 57.59% 
CLP 1,450 1 4 33 1,190 3 57.59% 
EnergyAustralia 1,400 1 2 23 978 2 30.97% 
CS Energy 820 1 6 22 1,000 2 23.26% 
Mitsui & Co* 795 2 10 38 1,376 3 57.59% 
Alinta Energy 760 2 6 24 1,107 2 21.97% 
Rio Tinto ** 708 1 6 39 1,100 2 100.00% 
NRG Energy** 630 1 6 39 1,100 2 100.00% 
Ratch Corporation 190 1 5 19 1,310 2 4.37% 
Alcoa 150 1 1 46 1,450 3 18.73% 
SLMA GPS** 143 1 6 39 1,100 2 100.00% 
Ryowa II GPS** 120 1 6 39 1,100 2 100.00% 
GE 114 1 2 3 1,310 2 23.06% 
YKK GPS** 80 1 6 39 1,100 2 100.00% 
All averages are weighted by the capacities of each SCPSs in the portfolio. 
*Jointly own Hazelwood and Loy Yang B Power Stations. Individual corporate MW capacity is listed as the fraction of the plant 
owned multiplied by the SCPS’s total MW capacity. 
**Jointly own Gladstone Power Station. Individual corporate MW capacity is listed as the fraction of the plant owned 
multiplied by the SCPS’s total MW capacity.  
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Carbon Intensity  
 
Following the IEA, the figures below define cutoffs of 880-1,120kg CO2/MWh for relatively efficient ‘new 
subcritical’ (coloured in yellow), 1,120-1,340kg CO2/MWh for ‘old efficient subcritical’ (orange), and 
>1,340kg CO2/MWh (red) for ‘old inefficient subcritical’.30As was noted in Table 4, among the other 
major SCPS generating countries, Australia has the worst average SCPS CO2 intensity by a considerable 
margin. The locations and carbon intensity of these power stations are depicted below. We invite firms 
who believe the data contained in this paper to be inaccurate to disclose this information publicly so we 
can revise the data accordingly. 
 
Figure 3: Australian SCPS Carbon Intensity by Total Generation Capacity 
 
With the exception of GDF Suez and Mitsui’s combined stake in the Hazelwood and Loy Yang B power 
stations, which both burn highly polluting brown coal; the top five companies with the most carbon 
intensive SCPS generation own relatively small and inefficient plants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
30 IEA (2012). Technology Roadmap: High Efficiency, Low-Emissions Coal-Fired Power Generation. Paris, France, OECD/IEA. 
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Table 8: Australian Portfolios by Carbon Intensity  
 
Owner Total Capacity 
(MW) 
Number 
of plants 
Number of 
Boilers 
Average 
Boiler Age 
Carbon Intensity kg 
CO2/MWh 
Alcoa 150 1 1 46 1,450 
GDF Suez Australian Energy* 1,855 2 10 38 1,376 
Mitsui & Co* 795 2 10 38 1,376 
Ratch Corporation 190 1 5 19 1,310 
GE 114 1 2 3 1,310 
CLP 1,450 1 4 33 1,190 
Origin Energy 2,880 1 4 32 1,130 
AGL Energy 6,840 3 12 34 1,125 
Synergy 2,034 3 13 34 1,113 
Alinta Energy 760 2 6 24 1,107 
Rio Tinto** 708 1 6 39 1,100 
NRG Energy** 630 1 6 39 1,100 
SLMA GPS** 143 1 6 39 1,100 
Ryowa II GPS** 120 1 6 39 1,100 
YKK GPS** 80 1 6 39 1,100 
Stanwell Corporation 2,800 2 8 25 1,085 
Delta Electricity 2,320 2 4 37 1,026 
CS Energy 820 1 6 22 1,000 
EnergyAustralia 1,400 1 2 23 978 
All averages are weighted by the capacities of each SCPSs in the portfolio. 
*Jointly own Hazelwood and Loy Yang B Power Stations. Individual corporate MW capacity is listed as the fraction of the plant 
owned multiplied by the SCPS’s total MW capacity. 
**Jointly own Gladstone Power Station. Individual corporate MW capacity is listed as the fraction of the plant owned multiplied by 
the SCPS’s total MW capacity.  
Air Pollution 
 
Of the pollutants associated with coal combustion, particulate matter (PM) is considered to be the most 
hazardous to human health. PM consists of the fly ash and dust particles generated during coal 
combustion,31 and is commonly classified into groups, either below 10 (PM 10) or below 2.5 (PM 2.5) 
microns in diameter,32 with PM 2.5 considered to be the more dangerous of the two. These fine particles 
consist of a mixture of all the air pollutants associated with coal combustion, and due to their small size 
can penetrate deep into the lungs and enter the bloodstream directly. 
 
                                                            
31 These particles can contain noxious compounds such as: acid droplets, arsenic, beryllium, cadmium, chromium, lead, manganese, 
nickel, radium, selenium, and other metals. 
32 Micron = One millionth of a meter: about 1/20th the width of a human hair. 
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Table 9: National SCPS Fleet Ambient Air Pollution 
 
  SCPS mean 
100km Radius 
PM 2.5 Levels 
(µg/m3)  
Number of SCPSs 
located in areas 
with air pollution 
exceeding the 
WHO PM 2.5 
limit 
Percentage of SCPSs 
located in areas with 
air pollution 
exceeding the WHO 
PM 2.5 limit 
National 
PM 2.5 
Limit 
(µg/m3)  
Number of SCPSs 
located in areas 
with air pollution 
exceeding their 
national PM 2.5 
limits 
Percentage of SCPSs 
located in areas with 
air pollution 
exceeding their 
national PM 2.5 
limits 
World 15 2,092 28.10% 20 n/a n/a 
China 50 825 88.71% 35 618 66.45% 
US 7 0 0.00% 12 0 0.00% 
EU 12 38 2.97% 25 0 0.00% 
India 32 539 88.65 40 115 18.91% 
Australia 2 0 0.00% 8 0 0.00% 
South Africa 8 0 0.00% 25 0 0.00% 
Indonesia 8 0 0.00% none n/a n/a 
Note: The WHO Annual Average PM 2.5 limit is 20 µg/m3. Indonesia lacks a PM 2.5 limit. The South African PM 2.5 limit is 
scheduled to be tightened from 25 to 20 µg/m3 beginning January 2016. ‘SCPSs located in areas with air pollution exceeding 
[specified] PM 2.5 limits’ consist of SCPSs which have average observed PM 2.5 levels within 100km which exceed the specified 
limits. 
 
Although PM 2.5 pollution surrounding SCPSs is a major issue for China and India, in Australia PM 2.5 
levels nearby SCPSs appear not be a major concern. Despite Australia possessing the tightest national PM 
2.5 limit among all major SCPS generating nations, no SCPS is located in an area that has average PM 2.5 
levels exceeding the national 8 µg/m3 limit.  
 
Figure 4: Australian SCPS by 100 km radius PM 2.5 Pollution 
 
 
Note: Desert conditions produce natural PM 2.5 that is also recorded by satellites as pollution. This effect is responsible for the 
higher levels of PM 2.5 measured across central Australia. 
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Table 10: Australian Portfolios by 100km Radius PM 2.5 
 
Owner Total Capacity 
(MW) 
Number of 
plants 
Number of 
Boilers 
Average 
Boiler Age 
Average PM 2.5 
µg/m3 
Alcoa 150 1 1 46 3 
GDF Suez Australian Energy* 1,855 2 10 38 3 
Mitsui & Co* 795 2 10 38 3 
CLP 1,450 1 4 33 3 
AGL Energy 6,840 3 12 34 2 
Synergy 2,034 3 13 34 2 
GE 114 1 2 3 2 
Delta Electricity 2,320 2 4 37 2 
EnergyAustralia 1,400 1 2 23 2 
Origin Energy 2,880 1 4 32 2 
Rio Tinto** 708 1 6 39 2 
NRG Energy** 630 1 6 39 2 
SLMA GPS** 143 1 6 39 2 
Ryowa II GPS** 120 1 6 39 2 
YKK GPS** 80 1 6 39 2 
Ratch Corporation 190 1 5 19 2 
Stanwell Corporation 2,800 2 8 25 2 
Alinta Energy 760 2 6 24 2 
CS Energy 820 1 6 22 2 
All averages are weighted by the capacities of each SCPSs in the portfolio. 
*Jointly own Hazelwood and Loy Yang B Power Stations. Individual corporate MW capacity is listed as the fraction of the plant 
owned multiplied by the SCPS’s total MW capacity. 
**Jointly own Gladstone Power Station. Individual corporate MW capacity is listed as the fraction of the plant owned multiplied by 
the SCPS’s total MW capacity.  
 
Water Stress  
 
Because SCPSs require greater water inputs for a given amount of generation, local water stress is also a 
factor that may affect the vulnerability of SCPSs to regulation.  
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Figure 5: Australia SCPS by Water Stress 
 
Although Australia’s interior is the driest part of the country, the most water stressed that contain SCPSs 
are located around centres of population in the East. There are three power plants located in catchments 
with 100% baseline water stress, these are Eraring, Vales, and Gladstone power stations owned by, 
respectively, Origin Energy, Delta Electricity, and Rio Tinto/NRG Energy/SLMA GPS/Ryowa II 
GPS/YKK GPS. 
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Table 11: Australian Portfolio Water Stress 
 
Owner Total Capacity 
(MW) 
Number of 
plants 
Number of 
Boilers 
Average 
Boiler Age 
Average Baseline 
Water Stress 
Origin Energy 2,880 1 4 32 100.00% 
Rio Tinto** 708 1 6 39 100.00% 
NRG Energy** 630 1 6 39 100.00% 
SLMA GPS** 143 1 6 39 100.00% 
Ryowa II GPS** 120 1 6 39 100.00% 
YKK GPS** 80 1 6 39 100.00% 
Delta Electricity 2,320 2 4 37 70.25% 
GDF Suez Australian Energy* 1,855 2 10 38 57.59% 
CLP 1,450 1 4 33 57.59% 
Mitsui & Co* 795 2 10 38 57.59% 
AGL Energy 6,840 3 12 34 55.00% 
Stanwell Corporation 2,800 2 8 25 38.22% 
EnergyAustralia 1,400 1 2 23 30.97% 
CS Energy 820 1 6 22 23.26% 
GE 114 1 2 3 23.06% 
Alinta Energy 760 2 6 24 21.97% 
Alcoa 150 1 1 46 18.73% 
Ratch Corporation 190 1 5 19 4.37% 
Synergy 2,034 3 13 34 1.87% 
 
All averages are weighted by the capacities of each SCPSs in the portfolio. 
*Jointly own Hazelwood and Loy Yang B Power Stations. Individual corporate MW capacity is listed as the fraction of the plant 
owned multiplied by the SCPS’s total MW capacity. 
**Jointly own Gladstone Power Station. Individual corporate MW capacity is listed as the fraction of the plant owned multiplied by 
the SCPS’s total MW capacity.  
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4. Costs of Closure  
 
As policymakers may be interested in inducing early closure of SCPS assets due to concerns over climate 
change and localised environmental impacts, our research conservatively models the maximum cost 
required to compensate the owners of Australian subcritical assets for premature retirement. This gives 
an indication of the maximum compensation cost for the phased closure of Australia’s SCPS fleet.  
 
These estimates do not include decommissioning costs or the costs of replacing closed capacity with new 
generation capacity or energy efficiency measures. However, our estimates of compensation are very 
conservative, and so are likely to significantly overestimate the total compensation required to induce 
permanent closure of Australian SCPSs, especially in the context of lower than anticipated power 
demand and the prospect of new emission regulations. 
 
We have created illustrative scenarios in which all SCPSs in Australia are closed within 5, 10, or 15-year 
time horizons. As part of this, we calculated the maximum conceivable compensation that could be paid 
to owners of SCPSs to induce premature retirement of their assets over these time periods. These 
estimates were made by calculating the Net Present Value (NPV) of profits foregone from the date of an 
asset being closed (e.g. 2020) and the end of the asset’s technical lifespan (e.g. 2030, assuming the asset 
had 10 more years of technical life at 2020) - we did this for all of the SCPS assets in Australia.   
 
Future profits are modelled using a revenues-minus-costs approach. Calculations are made individually 
for each generating unit until the end of their technical lives. Required compensation for mothballed 
plants is treated equivalently 33  to operational plants because the deliberate closure of currently 
operational plants could cause an increase in energy prices and incentivise mothballed plants to reopen. 
All calculations are made using highly conservative BAU assumptions.34 
 
Table 12: Subcritical Closure Scenarios 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
33 With the exception that mothballed units are assumed to become operational from 2016 onwards. 
34 See the appendix for a list of all assumptions.  
Scenario Years of Plant 
Closures 
% Generators Closed 
Annually 
Order of Closure Policy Assumptions 
S5 2016-2020 20%  
 
Oldest to Newest 
Direct regulation used for 
closure, no new subcritical 
capacity added, mothballed 
generators receive 
compensation as if they 
were operational  
S10 2016-2025 10% 
S15 2016-2030 6.7% 
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Figure 6: Maximum Conceivable Compensation (2015 AU$) 
 
 
 
For Australian SCPSs, the maximum conceivable compensation in 2015 prices would be AU$18.3bn (or 
AU$3.66bn per year) in scenario S5, AU$13.7bn (or AU$1.37bn per year) in scenario S10, and AU$8.4bn 
(or AU$560 million per year) in scenario S15. As is expected, total compensation decreases with scenario 
length because more generators reach their technical lifespan before they are eligible for compensation.  
 
Actual Compensation Necessary  
 
To estimate the compensation that would likely be necessary, a compensation estimation framework is 
applied to Australia. This framework is developed from three highly relevant case studies of 
compensation: the deregulation of US electricity generation, Australia’s own Contract for Closure 
programme, and the Montreal Protocol.35 
 
In the Australian case owners should only expect to receive partial compensation that is significantly less 
than the AU$18.3bn indicated in scenario S5, AU$13.7bn in scenario S10, and AU$8.4bn in scenario S15. 
This is due to the following reasons. First, Australia’s takings jurisprudence gives no indication that 
government should compensate firms for impairment of profits. Second, we identify no implicit or 
explicit contractual bases for compensation of firms by government. This is particularly the case given 
that the competitive National Electricity Market has operated for over 15 years. Third, there is very little 
precedent supporting the compensated closure of assets in Australia. The CFC programme provides 
some precedent, though it did not close a single asset. Australia’s carbon tax also provides precedent; 
however, we argue that this is more of a case of buyout of industry to allow policymaking than evidence 
of the necessity of compensation for the closure of assets. Fourth, as is recognized throughout this report, 
coal plays a significant factor in Australian politics. Because of this, we do not rule out investor 
compensation altogether. The evidence that this report cites for this conclusion is as follows. Australia’s 
most carbon-intensive generators were compensated for the effects of the now-repealed carbon tax on 
their profits. However, the comparison of our valuation of Hazelwood Power Station and their 2011 plant 
self-valuation for the CFC programme suggests that the dirtiest power stations were not in danger of 
imminent collapse, as was claimed. 
 
                                                            
35 Caldecott, B. and J. Mitchell (Forthcoming 2015). “Generating Implications for Climate Policy: The Premature Retirement of 
Subcritical Coal-Fired Generation and the Potential Role of Compensation.” Stranded Assets Programme, Smith School for 
Enterprise and Environment, University of Oxford. 
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The compensation modelling has assumed that all subcritical power stations would be part of the closure 
programme. A potentially significant way to further reduce the total cost of compensation, as well as the 
costs of decommissioning and replacement capacity, is for the closure programme to target a subset 
of SCPSs. 
 
Reverse Auctions  
 
Reverse auctions could be a policy mechanism for cost-effectively retiring SCPSs. Owners of SCPS assets 
would bid to receive a fixed price for each unit of generation capacity retired. The lowest bids would win 
the auction. While similar to the Contract for Closure and the Australian Emissions Reduction Fund, key 
design differences could lead to drastically different policy outcomes. For example: 
 
• Policies should combine both “carrots” and “sticks” to ensure that generators are retired as 
quickly and efficiently as possible, and that this process is politically viable.  
 
• Reverse auctions should be operated in tandem with the introduction of new emission 
regulations. 
 
• There should be a timeline for the retirement of subcritical generators, which could be based on 
the ratcheting up of an appropriately strict Emission Performance Standard (EPS). 
 
• A Coal Closure Fund (CCF) could be established - this would be a ring-fenced fund used to pay 
for reverse auctions.  
 
• Auctions could be operated annually or semi-annually until the year of mandatory closure or 
retrofit. The amount of compensation available could decrease with each auction in a 
“degression” model to further incentivise earlier retirement.  
 
Reverse auctions eliminate the problem of information asymmetry between government and the owners 
of SCPS assets. As some owners will have sunk costs (i.e. maintenance and retrofits), this lets owners 
reach an equitable outcome amongst themselves.  
 
This approach also establishes a robust framework for how owners can participate in negotiations. 
Political contestation around the closure of subcritical assets with reverse auctions is inevitable and 
should be expected; however, by creating a robust framework the potential for escalating compensation 
demands can be contained.  
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5. Conclusion 
 
In this working paper we analyse the environmental and regulatory risk exposure of all of Australia’s 22 
SCPSs comprising 26,088MW in total and the 19 companies that hold stakes in them. In addition, we 
provide conservative estimates for the compensation that would be required to voluntarily close these 
power stations within 5, 10, and 15-year time horizons. 
 
We find that Australia’s SCPS fleet is vulnerable to asset stranding caused by concerns over climate 
change and water stress and this is exacerbated due to advanced age and inefficiency. An average coal-
fired power plant’s operating life should be expected to be 40 years - currently the average age of 
Australia’s subcritical capacity is 31 years, and 64% of SCPSs are 30 years old or greater. In addition, 
Australia’s SCPS fleet has the highest carbon intensity of any other major SCPS generating nation at 1,132 
kg CO2/MWh. This leaves its SCPSs vulnerable to climate change legislation.  
 
Ambient PM 2.5 air pollution is not a pressing concern for SCPSs when compared with pollution 
problems in India and China, for example. However, an upcoming 2016 revision of the National 
Environmental Protection Measure for Ambient Air Quality (Air NEPM) could create a large-scale 
closure scenario similar to the US and EU.36 Aging SCPSs could be required to decide between permanent 
closure and large capital investment.  
 
Using standard assumptions we estimate that the compensation required to reimburse companies for the 
foregone revenues associated with closing all Australian SCPSs within 5, 10, and 15 years in 2015 prices 
would be AU$18.3bn. 13.7bn, and 8.4bn, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
36 See Caldecott, Dericks, and Mitchell (March 2015). “Stranded Assets and Subcritical Coal, The Risk to Companies and Investors.” 
Stranded Assets Programme, Smith School for Enterprise and Environment, University of Oxford. 
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Appendix 
Power Plant Data Notes 
Individual power plant information is taken from the most recent version (v3) of the Carbon Monitoring 
for Action (CARMA) database. This data is merged with plant-level data from Enipedia and new plant 
data from CoalSwarm. For CoalSwarm data only plants classified as currently operational are considered. 
Although CARMA was last systematically updated in 2009, Enipedia is continuously updated on an 
individual power plant basis. The merger between these datasets produced a dataset which effectively 
defined the locations of all of Australia’s power plants, the ownership of these plants, the annual 
megawatt hours of electricity produced at each plant, and the carbon intensity of each plant’s electricity 
production. Because subcritical coal power plants are the most carbon intensive form of energy 
production, we can infer which power plants are SCPSs based solely on their carbon intensity. Following 
the IEA, this report defines SCPSs are defined as power stations with ≥880 kg CO2/MWh. 
 
The CARMA data has a number of caveats which are thoroughly enumerated on its website (carma.org), 
but there are two points which are particularly relevant to this paper. The first is that, when actual 
measurements are unavailable, CARMA estimates CO2 emissions using statistical models. CARMA 
reports that the fitted CO2 emissions values are within 20% of the true value 60% of the time. Second, 
CARMA geographical location data varies in its degree of precision. For almost all power plants the 
state/province location is known, for 80% of power plants at least the city location is known, for 40% 
county/district data is known, and for 16% of power stations a unique postal code is assigned. 
Comparisons of approximate and precise coordinates suggest that the average spatial error is about 7 km. 
Particulate Matter (PM) 2.5 Data Notes 
For analysis of air quality risks associated with SCPSs, a measure of PM 2.5 is used. This data is taken 
from the analysis of Boys, Martin et al. (2014), and consists of annual ground-level PM 2.5 averages 
between 2010-12 derived from satellite observation. Particulate matter levels are naturally high above 
deserts due to windborne dust, and both this natural and anthropogenic sources of PM 2.5 show up in the 
Boys, Martin et al. (2014) data. This phenomenon appears to account for the high levels of PM 2.5 visible 
across the Sahara Desert and the Arabian Peninsula in spite of the low-levels of industrial activity in these 
locations. However, both of these regions are outside the study areas of this report. 
Water Stress Data Notes 
The measure for water stress used in this report is Baseline Water Stress (BWS) from Aqueduct created by 
the World Resources Institute (WRI). BWS is defined as total annual water withdrawals (municipal, 
industrial, and agricultural) expressed as a percent of the total annual available flow within a given 
watershed. Higher values indicate greater competition for water among users. Extremely high water 
stress areas are defined by WRI as watersheds with >80% withdrawal to available flow ratios, 80-40% as 
high water stress, 40-20% as high to medium, 20-10% as medium to low, and <10% as low. Mean water 
stress is calculated by taking the unweighted average of the water stress levels in each of the catchments 
where the applicable SCPSs are located. 
Modelling Assumptions 
Modelling Assumptions are based on Australian industry literature, International Energy Agency 
publications, and industry research37. Its intent is to provide a conservative business-as-usual case to 
estimate future profits, not to delve into the complexities of the Australian energy market. This method is 
in line with the approaches taken in two highly relevant cases of compensation: US Generation 
Deregulation and the closure of CFC-producing facilities by the Montreal Protocol.  
 
                                                            
37 Simshauser, P. (2014). The cost of capital for power generation in atypical capital market conditions. AGL Applied Economic and 
Policy Research. 
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 2016 Baseline 
Assumption 
Projections 
Effective Tax Rate 21% Stable 
Brown Coal Cost (AU$/MWh) $8 Tracking Inflation 
Black Coal Cost (AU$/MWh) $13.00 Tracking Inflation 
Total O&M (AU$/MWh) 1.28 Tracking Inflation 
Inflation rate (%/Year) 2.5% Stable 
AU$/US$ 1.3 Stable 
Wholesale Electricity Price (AU$/MWh) $41.015 Increases Approximately AU$.79/Yeari 
Auxiliary Consumption % 6% Stable 
Discount Rate 9% Stable 
Plant Life (Years) 40 N/A 
Payback Period (Years) 35 N/A 
Finance Interest Rate 10% Stable 
                                                            
i Average wholesale prices for NEM territories with SCPSs were analysed from 1998-2015 using linear regression. We then averaged the 
annual increases in territorial wholesale prices. We assume that increases will continue to occur at this rate. 
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